Abstract-Despite increasing interest by deploying SoS (Systems of Systems) to manag promote agility within their businesses, there research areas that are currently underdevelo is the role of standards within organisation operate and share systems within SoS. The p what standards should be chosen, or in Instead, it explores the information that ne and modelled, to reason about the standar systems of a SoS adhere to; and to provide a which to promote discussion of the incom inevitably arise within large SoS. The pap approach taken using a running example bas chain SoS for RAF Nimrod aircraft, in lig investigations into the explosion of an aircr paper concludes that the interaction of standa a complex issue, but that a methodology to dis analyse problems can be developed to furthe this area.
INTRODUCTION
The term SoS (System of Systems) has bee literature, but a general definition rema Some, including [2] define a separate term, to describe a SoS where software compon assembled using envisioned development precursors of which are available today in t such as Google App Engine. The term Systems) may also be encountered, denot are related in terms of background or (Federation of Systems) is another relate some authors [4] [5] to discuss decentralised does not overly restrict what should be defining the term broadly as follows:
A collection of member systems, comprise components, people, processes and considerations, working together to acco goals.
Despite being a recent term, many existing categorised as SoS, including major tel networks, the internet, financial s organisational supply chains etc. SoS m response to temporary conditions, for exam [6] originally designed to explore t machines and processes in coal m become a popular term within com understand the interactions that inf of complex systems. The impac agility made by the management a work processes, in combination wit significant challenge which is furt characteristics of SoS, including t [8] and organisational boundaries. Maier argued that interface and co become more important within So over other aspects of the system w largely autonomous member sy importance of standards within sy development as a whole has been r [10] . Standards could take many for multiple overlapping levels within in fig 1. The term standard does not refer ex and national agreements. Standa within an organisation, and remain use for commercial & competitiv through lack of applicability outside A table outlining some of the differ in a System, and standards in management context is provided in This paper argues that SoS can fac 
Systems
y be more permanent its core. The concept of in psychological theories the interaction of people, mining. However, it has mputer science [7] to help fluence the dependability t on dependability and and interaction of human th technical systems, is a ther complicated by the those of decentralisation ommunications standards S [9] , given that control would be devolved to the stems of a SoS. The ystem evolution and rerecognised for some time rms within SoS and have n organisations as shown xclusively to international rds may be developed n exclusively in internal ve reasons, rather than e a given organisation. rences between standards a System of Systems There has also been significant work into the mechanics of how standards form from a games theoretic perspective [14] . However, this aspect of research is outside the scope of this paper. Standards can be logically categorised from the perspective of who proposes them. Stango [15] outlined four main types:
• Un-sponsored (developed internally)
• Sponsored (by a standards organisation)
• De-facto (through market competition)
• De-jure (emerging through consensus within an industry). 
A. Standards and Trust
Assurance that a given organisation adheres to product and process standards that are approved of, is a driver for trust [17] . SoS cannot operate without trust, which in these circumstances cannot be built through recommendation to the extent that interactions between individuals can. This can partly be attributed to the lifespan of SoS, and the fact that organisations may choose not to trust the opinion of other potentially competing organisations. Trust can be built through a number of methods. Standards can be used for compliance purposes (a given party stating that they follow a given set of standards), certification where a third party attempts to prove an organisation follows a set of standards, and finally accreditation which allows an organisation to certify others. For example:
• X certifies Y • X is accredited to do so by Z • Z is the accreditation body, X is the certification body and Y has been certified When dealing with internally developed standards, the organisation that developed the standard is likely to behave as the accreditation body. Whether the resources and personnel are in place in order to certify others to use that standard within a SoS, is a matter which requires further investigation, an area which is explored further in section 3a.
B. Evolving Standards
In addition to considering the changing use of standards within a SoS, change within standards themselves also needs to be considered. Changes to a standard within a single system or organisation will affect those concerned. The lack of centralised control and transparency common to SoS, has the potential to cause additional problems relating to a lack of communication, and potential breakdown to work processes. An example of this was seen in the development of the Airbus A380. Airbus can be considered a SoS, as the organisation contains many autonomous member organisations, working across Europe, whilst also maintaining their own competitive businesses in parallel. The A380 launch was significantly delayed by wiring problems caused by engineers in Spain and Germany using different versions of the same design software [18] . Standards can take more effort to overhaul than the original effort expended [19] , for example, technical standards such as HTML, and organisational standards such as ISO 9000 have changed considerably over their lifetimes. As with any change, people will need to be informed, and the risks associated with compatibility between standards, and compatibility of versions within standards will need to be re-assessed on an ongoing basis.
C. Standards and Risk
Risk analysis is useful to ascertain the impact of deviation from the norm within the socio-technical structures of a given SoS [20] . For standard management, risk analysis is useful to structure discussions on how changes to standards in use affect SoS, and to help formulate actions that can be taken to avoid, minimise and mitigate such risks in future.
HAZOPS [21] is one approach to risk analysis originally developed for ICI (Imperial Chemical Industries) in the 1970s, which has been applied to wider domains, including work on socio-technical systems [22] . HAZOPS focuses on the identification of potential hazards using keywords which then have risk assessments attached, with a focus on technical operability and efficiency. HAZOPS keywords are used to construct tables, examining the effect of deviation from the norm for a given process. For example:
Given a specific deviation for a given process, (something occurring early, late, never, in reverse, too much etc)
• What are the consequences?
• What actions could be taken to mitigate the consequences? • What safeguards could be put in place?
• What are the risks of occurrence etc? Section 3b applies an adapted HAZOPs approach designed to explore the risks associated with standard configurations.
III. METHODOLOGY
This section addresses the following three points:
• What questions need to be asked regarding individual standard use, in order to manage the wider SoS? • How do you graphically model standards?
• How do you manage standards evolution through risk analysis?
Given the focus of the methodology on promoting discussions between those managing SoS a graphical technique is proposed. It has been argued [23] that graphical techniques are a better way to understand the complex interrelations between different organisations / systems. A visual notation could be constructed using existing diagram types from for example, UML or SysML, utilising object diagrams, sequence diagrams etc. However, developing diagrams in this manner requires at least cursory knowledge of UML, and requires the user to adapt the basic diagram types to fit the needs of standard modelling. In particular with reference to outlining the meta information gathered for each standard. As such this paper puts forward a simple proprietary format, geared towards the needs of standard analysis, supported by a tool to collate and analyse the data gathered.
A. SoS Standard Modelling
The methodology proposed allows stakeholders to construct diagrams to explore a number of different types of standard interaction within a SoS. Consistency of view between stakeholders within an organisation, or across organisations, is a goal to aim towards through discussion, and is unlikely to emerge immediately. The visual modelling notation proposed contains only organisations, systems, links (which can be annotated with meta information regarding type) and standards. Dependent on the area being modelled however, it may be useful to visually annotate the modelling notation with additional information to guide discussions. For example, to indicate which systems interact directly, whether there are common interests / goals, the flow of products or information between systems etc. Rather than constrain the end users of the methodology such additions are not currently standardised within the graphical notation, this area will be explored as part of future work in the area in consultation with industrial end users. In order to make best use of the diagrams produced, tool support has been designed to monitor the consistency of diagrams.
The following list outlines the meta information attached to the graphical representation of an individual standard:
• Type of Standard
As outlined in section II: Sponsored, unsponsored, dejure, de-facto.
• Enforcement processes in place
Standards are only useful when followed with rigor, evidence that an organisation performs periodic tests / reviews is an important consideration.
• Party responsible for adherence
Is the organisation responsible for checking its own compliance, or is that in the hands of another organisation, regulator or independent third party? • Evidence of adherence to the standard An important consideration in the building of trust.
• Support systems in place
To facilitate communication, documentation, training etc.
• Training provided
The use of both internal and external standards is weakened through poor training. Although 'on the job' training in situ has an important role in experiential learning, there has to be support in place to recover from problems caused by lack of experience [24] .
• Coverage of a system
Standards could cover countries, industries, companies, departments, areas of concern or individuals. By exploring where standards abut in a SoS, and analysing the system for risks associated with gaps in standard coverage across a SoS, a more dependable SoS configuration can be maintained.
• Responsibility for maintaining and updating standards With reference to external national and international standards, the role of maintainer could be held within the organisation that originally developed the standard, or in the case of standards embodied as laws it could rest with a national government / regulatory body.
• Process in place to support the evolution of individual standards, and the evolving use of standards within a given system? The role of maintainer within an organisation is necessary in the case of external international standards in order to ensure that the organisations processes adapt to changes within the standards themselves. In the case of standards embodied by laws such as the DPA there could be a legal imperative to roll out changes rather than a mere business / economic one.
• What applicable standards are not in place, and for what reasons? Many standards overlap; many have near duplicates, even within the same standards organisations. For example, differences between ISO 12207 and IEEE 12207 [25] . Standards should be followed or not followed for justifiable reasons (even if this is that a given standard has been embedded within an organisation for a long time).
Fig 2 outlines an example based on the organisations operating within the Nimrod SoS. As with many SoS, the organisations included are not wholly contained within the SoS, having significant work outside the SoS. This shows the implausibility of standard homogenisation at the organisational level. The SoS diagram has been annotated with additional data to show the links between organisations, in this case the flow of communication and contractual obligation between them. In particular it shows part procurement flow between the MOD and Cellular, and the role of BAE systems in fitting the parts supplied. A number of important points can be noted, some of which appear clear when represented graphically.
• Cellular were not CAA (Civil Aircraft Airworthiness) accredited to manufacture parts for aircraft.
• Upon further investigation it was determined that contractor B provided Taunton Aerospace with only a subset of the requirements mandated by MOD quality standards, and that in turn Taunton Aerospace only mandated ISO9002 compliance in Cellular.
• By sub contracting to organisations that were not ISO9000 series compliant, the MOD took a risk that the work processes followed by those sub-contractors would be of a sufficient standard. The limited disclosure of information within the inquiry report may have obscured whether the other contractors were in fact compliant with ISO9000, however, the fact remains that the MOD had little of knowing whether this was the case, depending on the next sub contractor down the line to check the standards of those they were subcontracting to.
• It was reported that although contractors A & B were certified to manufacture parts, they did not take on the role of testing parts they had sub-contracted, relying on the sub contractors own internal testing. This raises an interesting point regarding how sub contracted work is checked against the standards of its contractor.
Although incomplete, the information here is typical of the type of data that is likely to be available at this level when dealing with a decentralised control structure. It highlights questions that need to be asked, many of which may, on further examination reassure rather than highlight the need for change. However, where answers cannot be provided it shows the need for further investigation .  Fig 3 provides an example of an organisational breakdown of the MOD with regard to Nimrod part procurement. Within the diagram the term IPT refers to Integrated Project Teams, socio-technical systems containing personnel, processes and capabilities tasked with specific operations within the MOD. The convoluted nature of interactions within the MOD is believed to have weakened the awareness of those involved. The parts were contracted through Medical & General stores IPT for Nimrod IPT, however, Medical and General were non specialists who relied on the Air Commodities IPT to deal with technical matters pertaining to quality control with regard to contracting. A decision was made to test samples of parts a number of years before the explosion by Nimrod IPT & Air Commodities (who asked BAE to look into the matter). BAE reported they did not have the facilities to perform the required tests in full, but that the limited tests they could do did not indicate a problem. Interestingly, this statement halted further testing. It is plausible that by having two different IPTs responsible for ensuring safety standards were adhered to, neither was clear on their responsibilities. It was reported that Nimrod IPT staff were undertrained, and placed significant blind trust in BAE. In doing so they actually broke their own internal standards, in particular by not assigning an independent safety advisor. Throughout the Nimrod report there are indications that although in theory significant quality controls were in place, they were not followed, nor was adherence checked in others, and that many of the organisations involved within the supply chain did not follow their own internal procedures. Fig 4 illustrates a subset of the standards to which Nimrod operation was supposed to adhere. In this instance the sociotechnical system in question included the aircraft themselves, aircrew and maintenance staff responsible for keeping the aircraft operational, and the procedures they followed. Changes to the makeup of the SoS responsible for keeping Nimrod operational compounded standard adherence issues. It is clear that the original design for Nimrod breached design regulations at that time; in particular AvP (Aviation Publication) 970, the military version of BCARs (British Civil Aircraft Requirement), to which the commercial airliner was originally certified. However, continued improvement and change to the design over the next 40 years did not rectify this, partly because the risks associated with changes did not take into account the wider picture of the state of the design, effectively assuming the design must have met earlier standards without further investigation. A change considered and analysed in isolation without considering the wider environment can be a dangerous move. The Falklands war gives a prime example of how sudden evolution can affect standard adherence. During the war Nimrod aircraft were modified for in-flight refuelling, despite the fact that this modification involved breaking Defstan (Defence Standard) 00-970. After the war modifications were made permanent, however the report criticized BAE for not recognising during this remedial work that the original modifications breached Defstan 00-970. The evolution of systems, and their retro-fitting with current standards is also a significant issue which in Nimrod led to a number of breaches, which at first glance appeared to comply with the relevant standards. MOD standards dictated the use of Safety Cases in analysing the risks associated with aircraft operation within JSP (Joint Service Publication) 553. However, the Safety Case developed contained a number of serious mistakes which were at the time overlooked. The inquiry report stated the Safety Case was "riddled with errors". Part of the reason for this was the relative inaccessibility of the information system (CASSANDRA) in which the safety case was stored. The information stored within CASSANDRA was not considered portable, and was stored statically at one location (a site in Chadderton). The proprietary format, and licensing issues caused some degree of difficulty for the investigation even during the inquiry. The Safety Case itself was rushed, and those who depended on it had no way of knowing this. This example illustrates the difference between following the correct procedures and following the procedures correctly, and shows the importance of ensuring sufficient checks are in place. In this instance the poor quality of the JSP553 standard itself in prescribing the processes that needed to be followed, was partly to blame for this. This paper argues that many of these issues would have been picked up if the questions posed within the previous sections had been asked at the time.
B. Risk Analysis
In addition to the discussion format of graphical notation with accompanying questions, a risk analysis method is put forward which draws on the information gathered. Risks associated with the use and proposed use of standards within organisations can be categorised as follows:
• Risks relating to the potential use of standards in the future (proactive) • Adequacy of adherence (quality of use in terms of training, disciplinary action etc) • Risks related to transfer (handover) between standards during work processes (both proactive and during operation)
HAZOPS tables are constructed by bringing together a number of HAZOPs clauses which each explore one particular area of concern. A HAZOPS clause has the following structure:
Standard: The standard being analysed Category: Potential use / adequacy of adherence / transfer Risk Keyword: Early / Late / Never / Insufficient / Incompatibility Table 2 highlights a few of the issues that have been explored within this paper showing how, through methodical investigation, the problems could have been highlighted and dealt with through suitable risk analysis.
IV. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS
In the future this research will be further developed through the extension of the current tool prototypes developed within Visio, to allow integration with other systems modelling tools including UML, SysML, Responsibility modelling etc. This area is important as the methodology currently calls for the re-modelling of information that may already exist within given organisations. The research will be extended through an upcoming EPSRC grant application, designed to further develop and test the methodology put forward within real world organisations.
In conclusion, the area of standard use within SoS is complicated by the inherently decentralised and competitive nature of many SoS. However, although it remains a challenge for those who manage SoS, the application of best practice, in combination with suitable modelling and analysis, can offset much of the risk associated with standard use in this context. The paper has put forward a workable methodology for discursive analysis of standards specifically within SoS; and through the use of a real world running example has grounded the concepts discussed to show how they could discover and prevent real world problems. 
